




Kundakunda versus Sāṃkhya on the Soul 
 (published: Yoga in Jainism. Ed. Christopher Key Chapple. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN: 
978-1-138-82907-7. 2016. Pp. 37-47.) 
 
Conceptions of the soul there have been several in the history of Jainism. The probably oldest 
text of the Śvetāmbara Jaina canon, the Ācārāṅga Sūtra / Āyāraṃga Sutta, has some passages 
that reveal an idea about the soul that is very different from what came to be the classical 
Jaina conception. Dalsukh D. Malvania (1981) and others have drawn attention to Āyāraṃga 
176, which describes the soul in the following terms: "It is not long nor small nor round nor 
triangular nor quadrangular nor circular; it is not black nor blue nor red nor green nor white; 
neither of good nor bad smell; not bitter nor pungent nor astringent nor sweet; neither rough 
nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor hot; neither harsh nor smooth. It does not 
have a body, is not born again, has no attachment and is without sexual gender. While having 
knowledge and sentience, there is nonetheless nothing with which it can be compared. Its 
being is without form, there is no condition of the unconditioned. It is not sound nor form nor 
smell nor flavour nor touch or anything like that." (tr. Jacobi, 1884: 52, emended as in 
Dundas, 2002: 43). Āyāraṃga 171, moreover, states: "That which is the soul is that which 
knows, that which is the knower is the soul, that by which one knows is the soul." (tr. Dundas, 
2002: 44). The classical Jaina concept of the soul finds already expression in other texts of the 
Śvetāmbara canon. A verse of Uttarajjhayaṇa chapter 36 states: "The dimension of perfected 
[souls] is two-thirds of the height which the individual had in his last existence" (tr. Jacobi, 
1895: 212, modified). The Viyāhapannatti (7.8) compares the soul, which may cover the 
volume of an elephant or of a louse, with a lamp that lights up the space in which it is placed, 
sometimes a hut, sometimes the space determined by a cover (Deleu, 1970: 139). A short 
reference to the body-like size of the soul is also found in one of the concluding stanzas of the 
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Uvavāiya (171). This classical concept — as I have been able to show in another publication 
(2000) — appears to have been formed under the influence of Abhidharma Buddhism. 
 
It seems likely that the classical Jaina concept of the soul, whether under the influence of 
Buddhism or otherwise, was developed along with the special ideas of karma that came to 
occupy Jaina thinkers. But whatever its historical justification, it represents a somewhat 
idiosyncratic development which remained, as far as we can see, the exclusive property of 
Jainism. And even here it appears to have little to connect it with the origins of this religion. 
One reason for thinking so is constituted by the early canonical passages which I mentioned. 
Another one is that this classical concept barely fits in the surroundings out of which Jainism 
arose, and to which it originally belonged. Let us have a closer look at these surroundings. 
 
I have studied and analysed the cultural background of Jainism, Buddhism and other 
movements that were originally situated in the region east of the confluence of the two rivers 
Gaṅgā and Yamunā in a book called Greater Magadha (2007). Jainism shared with some of 
the other religious movements a preoccupation with karmic retribution, which in their case 
meant the belief that all acts inevitably will have an effect, often in a future life. Many of 
these religious movements were concerned to avoid the new lives that would come about as a 
result of acts carried out in the present and preceding lives. Early Jainism emphasized the 
need to abstain from all physical and mental activity. In other words, the advanced 
practitioner should abstain from all acts, with the result that he would not create new bases for 
karmic retribution. Acts that had been carried out before, whether in this or a preceding life, 
could be immunized, i.e. forced to fructify in this life, through the pain produced by ascetic 
practices. Since the ascetic practices that were believed to bring this about consisted 
themselves largely in the abstention from all activity, the physical and mental immobilization 
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pursued by the advanced Jaina ascetic served a double purpose: no new bases were laid for 
further karmic retribution, and the traces of acts carried out earlier were destroyed. 
 
This specific method to attain liberation from rebirth and karmic retribution did not crucially 
depend on any specific vision as to the true nature of the soul. Such a specific vision may 
have accompanied early Jainism, but we have already seen that the oldest canonical texts 
provide us with preciously little information to go by. There were however other religious 
movements at the same time and in the same region of northern India in which the concept of 
the soul did play a crucial role. These were the movements that believed that the soul, i.e. the 
real self of the human being (and of all other living beings for that matter), does not and 
cannot act by its very nature. Activity belongs to the body and the mind, both of which are 
essentially different from the inactive self. Karmic retribution, too, belongs for this reason to 
the realm of body and mind, without affecting the real self of a person. Knowledge of one’s 
real self frees from rebirth and karmic retribution, because knowledge of the self amounts to 
the realization that in deepest reality one does not act and has never acted. 
 
This notion of a real self that never acts lies at the heart of most philosophical thought that 
came to be associated with Brahmanism. It is very visible in Sāṃkhya, which divides all that 
exists in two totally distinct categories: on the one hand the selves, essentially and 
fundamentally inactive, and on the other hand all that which is active, whether physical or 
mental. The fundamental idea finds expression in a verse of the Bhagavad Gītā, which states:1 
“Actions are, all of them, undertaken by the guṇas of Prakṛti. He who is deluded by egoism 
thinks ‘I am the doer’.” The guṇas of Prakṛti are, in Sāṃkhya and therefore in texts like the 
Bhagavad Gītā which accept the fundamental ideas of Sāṃkhya, that which makes up all that 
                                                
1 Bhagavadgītā 3.27: prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni guṇaiḥ karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ / ahaṅkāravimūḍhātmā 
kartāham iti manyate //. 
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is active, i.e., all that is different from the inactive self. The self, for its part, is not involved in 
any acts, and indeed, if a person thinks that he is thus involved, he is deluded by egoism. It is 
Prakṛti that acts, and the self remains inactive throughout. The Bhagavad Gītā adds some 
practical teachings of its own. It does not teach that one should abstain from all activity. No, 
one should rather act in accordance with one’s own nature. The terms used to designate the 
nature of a person are prakṛti and svabhāva; these coincide, according to the Gītā, with a 
person’s own duty (svadharma), i.e., the duties associated with one’s position in life. The 
warrior Arjuna, for example, is told to carry out his duties as a warrior in a war that opposes 
him to members of his own family. The way to carry out such a task is by not being attached 
to the fruits, i.e. the results, of one’s acts. 
 
This short excursion into the teaching of the Bhagavad Gītā is useful as an introduction to the 
thought of Kundakunda as it expresses itself primarily in his Samayasāra , a work which “has 
greatly influenced Digambara thinking for centuries, and has been acclaimed by them as the 
most profound exposition of the Jaina doctrine” (Jaini, 1976: 30/92).2 Before turning to him, 
let me summarize what has been said so far. We are very poorly informed about the ideas on 
the self that were current in early Jainism. We do know that Jainism abandoned these early 
ideas, whatever they were, and turned to the idiosyncratic concept of the soul that 
accompanied it henceforth. We do not know for sure why the idea of an essentially inactive 
soul, which became so fertile in other currents of thought, was not incorporated in the 
classical beliefs of Jainism; I have already made the suggestion that the way in which Jainas 
elaborated their ideas about karma had a role to play in this. 
 
                                                
2 I have not had access to the “bewildering number of editions, reprints and commentaries” that exist 
of Kundakunda’s main works. They have been conveniently enumerated and presented by Royce 




These ideas about an inactive soul were not completely abandoned, however. Kundakunda’s 
ideas of the true nature of the self, I propose, have to be understood as attempts to introduce, 
perhaps reintroduce, them into Jainism, not, of course, in their original and primitive form, but 
adjusted to Jaina doctrine as it had taken shape in the meantime. 
 
Recall, at this point, that the notion of a totally inactive soul or self, where it is accepted, is 
inseparable from the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. More precisely, knowledge of 
the true, inactive, nature of the self is always presented as an essential step toward the 
ultimate goal of liberation. The implication of this fact is that the way in which karmic 
retribution is conceived is closely connected with the way the self is thought of. Briefly put, 
the self is free from all those features that are responsible for rebirth and karmic retribution. 
For most currents of thought in ancient India, these features cover all acts carried out by a 
person. It goes without saying that, if others were to believe that only certain acts, not all of 
them, lead to karmic retribution, they are free to postulate the existence of a self that is only 
free from those specific acts, not necessarily free from all of them. In other words, they may 
believe in a self whose activity is limited to such acts as do not brings about karmic 
retribution. 
 
This, I submit, is the position of Kundakunda in his Samayasāra . His main point is similar to 
the one that finds clearest expression in Sāṃkhya and related texts, viz., that an essential step 
on the road to liberation is the realization that one’s self is different from activity that leads to 
karmic retribution. The ripening of the fruit arising from karma does not belong to the self, we 
read in verse 208, for the self is different from it. The Jinas, verse 210 adds, have pointed out 
that there are many such ripenings, but these are not my own natures: I am only a knower by 
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nature. However, he who still has if ever so little attachment or other faults left, does not 
know his self, however learned he may be (211). 
 
The similarity between Sāṃkhya and the thought propounded by Kundakunda is undeniable. 
The similarity is however only superficial, and there are important differences. As a matter of 
fact, Sāṃkhya is mentioned and criticized in the Samayasāra . What is more, the teaching of 
the Bhagavad Gītā is criticized, too, be it implicitly. Let us begin with the latter. 
 
Verse 335 states that one becomes liberated when one gives up the fruit of one’s deeds. This 
is close to the main teaching of the Bhagavad Gītā.  However, the then following verse 336 
adds an important specification. The ignorant person, it states, since he resides in the own 
nature (svabhāva) of Prakṛti, experiences the fruit of his deeds; he who possesses knowledge, 
on the other hand, knows the fruit of his deeds but does not experience it as arisen.3 The use 
of the words svabhāva and prakṛti, so typical for the Bhagavad Gītā, confirms our suspicion 
that Kundakunda here criticizes this text in particular. Unlike the Bhagavad Gītā, he is of the 
opinion that only an ignorant person will follow his own prakṛtic nature. Only the person 
incapable of liberation (abhavya)4 will not give up Prakṛti, verse 338 adds. The knowing 
person neither carries out nor experiences the various kinds of acts; however, he knows their 
result, as he knows bondage, merit and demerit (340). 
 
However, Kundakunda does not only voice criticism of the practical path taught by the 
Bhagavad Gītā. He is of the opinion that the underlying Sāṃkhya philosophy is not up to the 
mark, either. Indeed, if all that is active is, for that reason, part of Prakṛti, the conclusion must 
                                                
3 Samayasāra 336: aṇṇāṇī kammaphalaṃ payaḍisahāvaṭṭhido du vededi / ṇāṇī puṇa kammaphalaṃ 
jāṇādi udidaṃ ṇa vededi // (Sanskrit: ajñānī karmaphalaṃ prakṛtisvabhāvasthitas tu vedayate / jñānī 
punaḥ karmaphalaṃ jānāti uditaṃ na vedayate //). 
4 Cp. Jaini, 1977. 
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be that Prakṛti is the only agent around. Prakṛti, however, is unconscious. Unconscious Prakṛti 
would in this way turn the self into one that has a correct or incorrect understanding of the 
world (vv. 353, 354). And all selves would be inactive (366). Kundakunda does not accept 
this. For him the soul is subject to change. Indeed, he points out in an earlier verse (127; cp. 
124) that if the soul did not undergo modifications, there would be no cycle of rebirths 
(saṃsāra) and the Sāṃkhya philosophy would be correct.5 
 
According to Kundakunda, then, the soul is active, at least to some extent. Verse 127, just 
considered, states that the soul is modified by bhāvas such as anger (krodha). Kundakunda 
makes a point of regularly using the verb “to do, to make” (Skt. kṛ) in connection with words 
denoting the soul. What, then, is it that the soul makes or does? The word often used as object 
in such situations is bhāva.6 Recall that anger was called a bhāva in the verse just considered. 
We may assume that bhāvas are states of the soul, which the latter “makes” or “produces”, 
presumably by a process of modification. The soul, we learn in another verse (28), can be 
connected with many bhāvas.7 
 
An important verse states that the self makes a bhāva and is its agent from the highest point of 
view, while from a practical, and therefore lower, point of view, it is the agent of material 
karma.8 This is to be understood in the light of the fact that karma in Jainism is thought of as a 
material substance which clings to the soul and is responsible for the cycle of rebirths it 
undergoes. Freedom from this substance signifies freedom from rebirth. Total inactivity on 
                                                
5 Samayasāra 127/3.54: apariṇamaṃte hi sayaṃ jīve kohādiehi bhāvehiṃ / saṃsārassa abhāvo 
pasajjade saṃkhasamao vā // (Sanskrit: apariṇamamāne hi svayaṃ jīve krodhādibhiḥ bhāvaiḥ / 
saṃsārasyābhāvaḥ prasajyate sāṃkhyasamayo vā //). 
6 E.g. Samayasāra 190. 
7 bahubhāvasamjutto; Skt. -saṃyuktaḥ. 
8 Samayasāra 24: jaṃ kuṇadi bhāvam ādā kattā so hodi tassa bhāvassa / ṇicchayado vavahārā 
poggalakammāṇa kattāraṃ // (Sanskrit: yaṃ karoti bhāvam ātmā kartā sa bhavati tasya bhāvasya / 
niścayataḥ vyavahārāt pudgalakarmaṇāṃ kartā //). 
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the part of the soul is not required. The soul, in Kundakunda’s opinion, is active: some of this 
activity has as consequence that material karma attaches itself to the soul, with the results we 
know. Activities of the soul that do not cause material karma to cling to it do not have this 
effect; they do not involve the soul in the endless cycle of rebirths. It follows that the soul 
must act in the right manner in order to be freed from saṃsāra. In Sāṃkhya the soul could not 
do a thing to bring about its liberation; it depended on the activity of Prakṛti. Kundakunda’s 
soul can do something, and is indeed ultimately responsible for its own liberation. 
 
The self, verse 88 points out, is an agent by its own bhāva, but it is not the agent of all the 
bhāvas produced by material karma.9 The following verse explains this further: From the 
highest standpoint the self makes nothing but itself and experiences itself.10 How does the self 
produce and experience itself, or rather its own bhāva? Verse 93 appears to present the 
answer: “Just as the self makes its own bhāva because of material karma, so it experiences its 
own bhāva because of material karma.”11 
 
It is clear from what precedes that Kundakunda distinguishes between bhāvas that belong to 
the soul and are in a certain way identical with it, and such that are not. This is confirmed by 
verse 94, which states that error and bhāvas such as anger are of two kinds: they are either the 
soul (jīva) or not the soul (ajīva).12 It follows from verse 95 that the difference lies in what is 
                                                
9 Samayasāra 88/3.14: ... kattā ādā saeṇa bhāveṇa / puggalakammakadāṇaṃ ṇa du kattā 
savvabhāvāṇaṃ // (Sanskrit: ... kartā ātmā svakena bhāvena / pudgalakarmakṛtānāṃ na tu 
sarvabhāvānām //). 
10 Samayasāra 89/3.15: ṇicchayaṇayassa evaṃ ādā appāṇam eva hi karedi / vedayadi puṇo taṃ ceva 
jāṇa attā du attāṇaṃ // (Sanskrit: niścayanayasyaivam ātmātmānam eva hi karoti / vedayate punas 
taṃ caiva jānīhi ātmā tv ātmānam //). 
11 Samayasāra 93: poggalakammaṇimittaṃ jaha ādā kuṇadi appaṇo bhāvaṃ / poggalakammaṇimittaṃ 
taha vedadi appaṇo bhāvaṃ // (Sanskrit: pudgalakarmanimittaṃ yathātmā karoti ātmanaḥ bhāvam / 
pudgalakarmanimittaṃ tathā vedayati ātmano bhāvam //). 
12 Samayasāra 94/3.19: micchattaṃ puṇa duvihaṃ jīvam ajīvaṃ taheva aṇṇāṇaṃ / aviradi yogo moho 
kodhādīyā ime bhāvā // (Sanskrit: mithyātvaṃ punar dvividhaṃ jīvo ‘jīvas tathaivājñānam / aviratir 
yogo mohaḥ krodhādyā ime bhāvāḥ //). 
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called upayoga, which is often translated application of consciousness.13 Ignorance, 
intemperance and error are jīva, on condition that they are upayoga.14 Indeed, they are 
modifications of upayoga connected with confusion; these modifications fall into three main 
categories: error, ignorance and intemperance.15 Upayoga is in this way of three kinds, and 
itself a bhāva that is pure and unsullied; whatever further bhāva it creates, it is its agent.16 
 
So far the discussion deals with activities that take place within the self and which for this 
reason have themselves no karmic consequences. However, material substance modifies itself 
in accordance with what happens in the self: “Whatever bhāva the self produces, it is its 
agent; [however,] material substance modifies itself in relationship to that, and turns itself into 
karma.”17 At this point confusion is likely to enter: “The soul consisting of ignorance makes 
something else into itself, and itself into something else. It becomes in this way the agent of 
the karmas.”18 The soul thinks it becomes the agent of the karmas, but this is due to 
ignorance. In reality it is not. The soul possessed of correct knowledge knows better: “The 
soul consisting of correct knowledge does not make something else into itself, and itself into 
                                                
13 On this term, see Johnson, 1995: 97 ff.; Soni, 2007. 
14 Samayasāra 95/3.20: poggalakammaṃ micchaṃ jogo aviradi aṇṇāṇam ajjīvaṃ / uvaogo aṇṇāṇaṃ 
aviradi micchatta jīvo du // (Sanskrit: pudgalakarma mithyātvaṃ yogo ‘viratir ajñānam ajīvaḥ / 
upayogo ‘jñānam aviratir mithyātvaṃ ca jīvas tu //). 
15 Samayasāra 96/3.21: uvaogassa aṇāī pariṇāmā tiṇṇi mohajuttassa / micchattaṃ aṇṇāṇaṃ 
aviradibhāvo ya ṇādavvo // (Sanskrit: upayogasyānādayaḥ pariṇāmās trayo mohayuktasya / 
mithyātvam ajñānam aviratibhāvaś ceti jñātavyaḥ //). 
16 Samayasāra 97/3.22: edesu ya uvaogo tiviho suddho ṇiraṃjaṇo bhāvo / jaṃ so karedi bhāvaṃ 
uvaogo tassa so kattā // (Sanskrit: eteṣu copayogas trividhaḥ śuddho niraṃjano bhāvaḥ / yaṃ sa karoti 
bhāvam upayogas tasya sa kartā //). 
17 Samayasāra 98/3.23: jaṃ kuṇadi bhāvam ādā kattā so hodi tassa bhāvassa / kammattaṃ 
pariṇamade tamhi sayaṃ poggalaṃ davvaṃ // (Sanskrit: yaṃ karoti bhāvam ātmā kartā sa bhavati 
tasya bhāvasya / karmatvaṃ pariṇamate tasmin svayaṃ pudgaladravyam //). 
18 Samayasāra 99/3.24: param appāṇaṃ kuvvadi appāṇaṃ pi ya paraṃ karaṃto so / aṇṇāṇamao jīvo 
kammāṇaṃ kārago hodi // (Sanskrit: param ātmānaṃ karoti ātmānam api ca paraṃ kurvan saḥ / 
ajñānamayo jīvaḥ karmaṇāṃ kārako bhavati //). 
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something else. It is not the agent of the karmas.”19 “He who knows that the self does not 
make the modifications of material substance [such as] the obstructions of knowledge, he 
possesses correct knowledge.”20 
 
The picture which develops out of these and other verses is the following. There are two 
fundamentally different realms: that of karma, which is a material substance, and that of the 
soul. The soul, though not without activity, is not the agent of anything that takes place in the 
karma which belongs to the material realm. However, it can have a causal effect on karma, 
through its activity within its own realm. One can therefore say that the soul produces karma, 
but only metaphorically: “Having seen the modification of bondage, the soul being its cause, 
it is said that karma has been produced by the soul, but only metaphorically.”21 “Even though 
a battle is carried out by soldiers, people say that it is carried out by the king. In the same way, 
the obstruction of knowledge and other such things are produced by the soul [only] from a 
practical point of view.”22 
 
The distinction, in this discussion, between a higher point of view and a practical point of 
view is unavoidable.23 Indeed, it is the confusion between these two which is responsible for 
the fact that most people do not see the road to liberation. This is not only true of 
Kundakunda’s thought. It applies with equal force to the Sāṃkhya system of thought which 
                                                
19 Samayasāra 100/3.25: param appāṇam akuvvī appāṇaṃ pi ya paraṃ akuvvaṃto / so ṇāṇamayo jīvo 
kammāṇam akārago hodi // (Sanskrit: param ātmānaṃ akurvann ātmānam api ca param akurvan / sa 
jñānamayo jīvaḥ karmaṇām akārako bhavati //). 
20 Samayasāra 108/3.33: je puggaladavvāṇaṃ pariṇāmā hoṃti ṇāṇa āvaraṇā / ṇa karedi tāṇi ādā jo 
jāṇādi so havadi ṇāṇī // (Sanskrit: ye pudgaladravyāṇāṃ pariṇāmā bhavanti jñānāvaraṇāni / na 
karoti tāny ātmā yo jānāti sa bhavati jñānī //). 
21 Samayasāra 112/3.37: jīvamhi hedubhūde baṃdhassa ya passidūṇa pariṇāmaṃ / jīveṇa kadaṃ 
kammaṃ bhaṇṇadi uvayāramatteṇa // (Sanskrit: jīve hetubhūte baṃdhasya ca dṛṣṭvā pariṇāmam / 
jīvena kṛtaṃ karma bhaṇyate upacāramātreṇa //). 
22 Samayasāra 113/3.38: yodhehiṃ kade juddhe rāeṇa kadaṃ ti jaṃpade logo / taha vavahāreṇa 
kadaṃ ṇāṇāvaraṇādi jīveṇa // (Sanskrit: yodhaiḥ kṛte yuddhe rājñā kṛtam iti jalpate lokaḥ / tathā 
vyavahāreṇa kṛtaṃ jñānāvaraṇādi jīvena //). 
23 See on this distinction Bhatt, 1974. 
 11 
 
Kundakunda criticizes. There, too, the failure to see the distinction between the realm of the 
soul and the realm of Prakṛti keeps people tied up in the world of eternal transmigration. This 
is not to say that Kundakunda’s thought is identical with Sāṃkhya. Unlike Sāṃkhya, the soul 
as conceived of by Kundakunda is capable of certain activities, which are however limited to 
its own domain. All this we have seen. 
 
The verses of the Samayasāra  present, sometimes in quick succession, the two different 
points of view just mentioned. This can easily lead to confusion. Since all verses do not 
explicitly state whether they present the highest or the practical point of view, the impression 
is often created that they contradict each other. The contradictions, it seems to me, can almost 
always be resolved by keeping the two points of view in mind, and assigning, of two 
contradictory verses, one to the highest point of view, the other to the practical point of view. 
Kundakunda’s main point, unsurprisingly, is to emphasize that the soul is not, and cannot be, 
the agent of what happens in the material world of karma. This is essential, because it is this 
knowledge that allows of a dissociation of the self from all that which leads to karmic 
retribution. Kundakunda’s ideas about the realm of the self in which the self can be an agent 
constitute a theoretical elaboration meant to distinguish his thought from Sāṃkhya — which 
he obviously looks upon as a close competitor — and no doubt to allow place for certain 
traditional Jaina notions as to the possibility of the soul to be an agent after all. Indeed, verse 
127 points out that if the soul did not transform itself into states such as anger, this would 
signify the end of the cycle of rebirths, or the acceptance of Sāṃkhya.24 
 
The preceding analysis of the thought of the Samayasāra  reveals a vision of the place of the 
soul in the world and of its place on the path to liberation that is coherent and credible. This 
                                                
24 See above, note 3. 
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depiction of the self does not “very much resemble that of the Upaniṣadic and Advaitic 
Brahman or Ātman”, as it has been claimed.25 It resembles the self of Sāṃkhya in some 
respects, but differs from it in certain others, voluntarily so, as we have seen. Nor do I see any 
reason to look upon the Samayasāra  as a “heterogeneous repository of accumulated 
Digambara teaching, [...] rather than the imperfectly preserved work of an individual 
heterodox philosopher”.26 This is not to deny that its author used traditional material, nor do I 
wish to claim that he was necessarily a complete innovator. But in reading the Samayasāra  , I 
do have the impression of being confronted with the work of someone who wished to 
incorporate into Jainism a notion that had become very fruitful and useful in other currents, 
primarily Sāṃkhya, but also elsewhere. The author of the Samayasāra  is explicit about his 
concern to take over the central idea of Sāṃkhya, at the same time improving upon it. In order 
to do so, he had to think out a competing system, an attempt in which he succeeded to at least 
some extent. The fact that the Samayasāra  can, by and large, be read as a text expressive of a 
coherent thesis is the best argument there could be to maintain that it had one single author, 
whether he was called Kundakunda or otherwise.27 
 
Some other works ascribed to Kundakunda represent by and large the same thesis as the one 
propounded in the Samayasāra . The Pravacanasāra, in particular, has some verses that state 
in so many words that the soul can be active, but only in its own domain. According to 
Pravacanasāra II.92, “The self, making its own nature, becomes the agent of its own bhāva, 
                                                
25 Singh, 1974: 85, as cited by Johnson (1995: 238). Nor do Kundakunda’s teachings resemble early 
Advaita Vedānta, as claimed by Dhaky (1991), referred to in Dundas, 2002: 291 n. 52. 
26 Johnson, 1995: 265. 
27 Johnson (1995: 111) does not seem to think otherwise: “as far as I know, the upayoga doctrine does 
not appear in this form in any recorded source prior to Kundakunda. Indeed, commentators frequently 
remark upon the peculiarity, or uniqueness of Kundakunda in this respect. For all hermeneutic 
purposes, therefore, he must be taken as the originator of this particular form of the upayoga doctrine.” 
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but not the agent of all the bhāvas that consist of material substance.”28 Two verses further, 
the same text states: “The [self], now being the agent of its own modification born from its 
[own] substance, is sometimes taken [and sometimes] freed by the dust of karma.”29 
Pravacanasāra I.9 attributes to the soul (jīva) itself three states: “While the soul, whose 
nature is modification, modifies into something auspicious by means of an auspicious [state], 
into something inauspicious by means of an inauspicious [state], it becomes pure by means of 
a pure [state].”30 “If the self itself is not auspicious or inauspicious by nature, there will be no 
cycle of rebirths for embodied beings.”31 The Pañcāstikāyasāra contains similar statements, 
among them the following: “Since it makes its own bhāva, the self is the agent of its own 
bhāva, not of the material karmas; this is how the words of the Jina must be understood.”32 It 
is on account of a modification in the soul that karma attaches itself to it (v. 128).  
 
We can contrast this with the Paramātmaprakāśa of Yogīndu, which is sometimes claimed to 
continue the thought of Kundakunda; this text does not contain any statement supportive of 
                                                
28 Pravacanasāra II.92: kuvvaṃ sabhāvam ādā havadi hi kattā sagassa bhāvassa / 
poggaladavvamayāṇaṃ ṇa du kattā savvabhāvāṇaṃ // (Sanskrit: kurvan svabhāvam ātmā bhavati hi 
kartā svakasya bhāvasya / pudgaladravyamayānāṃ na tu kartā sarvabhāvānām //). 
29 Pravacanasāra II.94: sa idāṇiṃ kattā saṃ sagapariṇāmassa davvajādassa / ādīyade kadāī 
vimuccade kammadhūlīhiṃ // (Sanskrit: sa idānīṃ kartā san svakapariṇāmasya dravyajātasya / 
ādīyate kadācid vimucyate karmadhūlibhiḥ //). 
30 Pravacanasāra I.9: jīvo pariṇamadi jadā suheṇa asuheṇa vā suho asuho / suddhena tadā suddho 
havadi hi pariṇāmasabbhāvo // (Sanskrit: jīvaḥ pariṇamati yadā śubhenāśubhena vā śubho ‘śubhaḥ / 
śuddhena tadā śuddho bhavati hi pariṇāmasvabhāvaḥ //). On the difference between śuddha “pure” 
and śubha “auspicious”, see Pravacanasāra III.45: “Śramaṇas have pure consciousness and auspicious 
consciousness ...; among them those who have pure consciousness are without āsravas and the others 
are with āsravas” (samaṇā suddhuvajuttā suhovajuttā ya hoṃti samayamhi / tesu vi suddhuvajuttā 
aṇāsavā sāsavā sesā //; Sanskrit: śramaṇāḥ śuddhopayuktāḥ śubhopayuktāś ca bhavanti samaye / teṣv 
api śuddhopayuktā anāsravāḥ sāsravāḥ śeṣāḥ //); further Johnson, 1995: 112 f. 
31 Pravacanasāra I.46: jadi so suho va asuho ṇa havadi ādā sayaṃ sahāveṇa / saṃsāro vi ṇa vijjadi 
savvesiṃ jīvakāyāṇaṃ // (Sanskrit: yadi sa śubho vā aśubho na bhavati ātmā svayaṃ svabhāvena / 
saṃsāro ‘pi na vidyate sarveṣāṃ jīvakāyānām //). 
32 Pañcāstikāyasāra 61: kuvvaṃ sagaṃ sahāvaṃ attā kattā sagassa bhāvassa / ṇa hi 
poggalakammāṇaṃ idi jiṇavayaṇaṃ muṇeyavvaṃ // (Sanskrit: kurvan svakaṃ svabhāvam ātmā kartā 
svakasya bhāvasya / na hi pudgalakarmaṇām iti jinavacanaṇ jñātavyam //). 
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Kundakunda’s vision of the soul’s nature. Quite on the contrary, it states in no uncertain terms 
that the highest point of view is that the self does nothing whatsoever.33 
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